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The soul, doubtless, is immortal  
where a soul can be discerned 
Robert Browning 
 
IN_HIS UNZEITGEMÄSSE LAUDATIONS OF 
Descartes, Galen Strawson1 repeats that there 
is nothing in the world so directly certain and 
evident as consciousness. This is often for-
gotten, and right. And yet not so perfectly, 
transparently right as we (and Renée Des-
cartes, and Galen Strawson, and John Searle 
and Hector-Neri Castañeda, and, perhaps, 
Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel and Johann 
Gottlieb Fichte) might wish – as we would 
wish that the self and surrounding faculties 
also were. Consciousness, esp. self-con-
sciousness, is perhaps not an all-or-nothing 
matter – remarkably like language in other 
respects. 
The huge phenomenon of (quasi-)indexi-
cality, for instance, is interwoven with prob-
lems of semantic interpretation, syntax, 
grammaticalization, and knowledge. The 
consequent phenomena of de se (D.K. Lewis 
and others), and “de se communication”, so 
to speak, pose one more challenge – beyond 
those raised by Chomsky, Ann Banfield and 
others2 – to those who see language as com-
municational in essence and evolution ary 
origins. Marchi & Romano, and Fiorin & 
Delfitto, deal with these themes from         
different “transformational” perspectives. 
Marchi & Romano’s observations are rele-
vant for the parallels between consciousness 
and cognitive/linguistic structures I refer to 
here._ 
In different ways, Marraffa tackles the 
problems of the self. The self is often so in-
terestingly useless! For self-consciousness, 
close and evident as it may be with its impli-
cations, is episodic and brief. Moments of it, 
precious but inconstant, emerge from, and 
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are submerged by, the flow of automatic    
responses or meditation, or non-selfcentered 
thinking, and deep, oblivious focusing on 
new things (or own thoughts) after volitional 
and self-centered corrections, and so on and 
on. Some forms of natural language are mo-
nologic; but transparency is not obvious. 
Self-thinking may be virtually there, but sel-
dom in a well-defined foreground.3 
This poses for him, as for so many, the 
classical problem of the “unconscious”, and 
the related structuring of “narratives”, postu-
lated as necessary for the purposes of the self. 
G. Strawson must be again right that narra-
tivity and such are fashionable terms, ipso 
facto abused terms. Can they bear the argu-
mentative burdens so many discourses im-
pose on them? Asking this is not to deny that, 
at some levels, the self(ves) may well depend 
on narrative mechanisms. For Marraffa, rele-
vant levels here are associated with the com-
munitarian, evolutive and integrated di-
mension of self-consciousness. The_self and 
conscious mind originally display defense 
functions. Correspondingly, they exist 
through selections of unconscious contents. 
Such selections are, in their turn, related to 
the “self” as bearer of responsibilities and de-
cisions. Interestingly, these two basic con-
nections may be appreciated independently 
of narrativity per se. _ 
So sometimes the self is not relevant, 
though it may retain a hidden primacy. An 
actual phenomenal self, resting on the        
distinction between simple awareness and 
consciousness proper (Chalmers, Kim),4 is 
the main candidate for that role of primacy. 
The distinction seems conceivable and logi-
cally possible, but is it conceptually and me-
taphysically, let alone physically right? I’ll 
briefly pursue this possibility. The papers col-
lected here, e.g. Voltolini’s, do not address 
this possibility, but leave it open, in some 
cases clearing new grounds for it. (For Volto-
lini, a further, apt mark of the mental might 
be looked for in phenomeno-qualitative 
characters of thinking behind the structures 
of language, in non-intentional, non-
normative properties). Be it mere possibility 
as it may, if taken seriously, this would make 
the scope and realm of consciousness vast  
indeed: through individualistic thinking 
(though not so-called Cartesian dualism, I’ll 
claim), through neutral monism, through 
panpsychism even. In the ’20s, Russell5 had 
envisaged these possibilities. The question of 
dualism stays, however, unclear. There are 
arguments in the literature to the effect that 
defending property dualism may be harder 
than defending substance dualism, maudit as 
it is. No contributions here deal with the 
matter of that historically unhappy turn of 
phrase, “Cartesian dualism”. I shall try to 
make up for this in the present pages. 
But what are the limits of consciousness, 
and are they determinate, or fuzzy? And how 
large and deep is consciousness? Again not 
surprisingly, such questions may be repeated 
for human language, with its unique capabi-
lity for self-ascription. In 1984, Langendoen 
and Postal, and now again Langendoen, no-
toriously claimed that natural languages may 
well be transfinite.6 The point Hinzen and 
Uriagereka do not dwell on in their 2006 pa-
per is exactly that their «conclusion – that 
languages in their entirety don’t have genera-
tive grammars that can construct them – 
may well be empirically defensible on other 
grounds [...]». As Hinzen and Uriagerieka 
note, this possibility raises «in the linguistic 
domain» questions akin to those posed for 
mathematics and logic by Penrose,7 and, I 
add, perhaps more subtly by Gödel’s specula-
tions. The human mind may exceed what is 
called the “Turing bound”, i.e. be essentially 
more than a machine. This could be seen in 
the way it realizes computations of different 
kinds in language and maths. If such analyses 
are conceivable, a new level of depth is added. 
Voltolini’s paper, as Marraffa’s and Ori-
lia’s, shows how subtle questions in the phi-
losophy of mind and logic are essential to 
substantive issues about the language, ones 
considered by neurophilosophers. Let one 
more parallel be pointed out. When philo-
sophers wisely leave the dimension of lan-
 Varnier 
 
140 
guage and thought, they go for propositions, 
i.e. mostly possible world semantics. Genera-
tive models of language seem to overgenerate 
sentences: no really understandable sentence 
has, say, 200 components or ten embed-
ments. But, as said, according to some they 
undergenerate too. It’s the same with propo-
sitions: either overgeneration (problems such 
as logical omniscience), or undergeneration 
(de se “propositions”, indexical self-
identifications, etc.). Food for thought.8 
Not surprisingly, those who initiated new 
ways of looking at life, consciousness and 
language in their interrelationships were not 
philosophers. Up to the present day, psycho-
logists, Continental thinkers, and “epoch-
making” gurus, both from the right and the 
left, went on telling us that society, history 
and politics promise a new synthesis that 
never came alive – or is just stillborn – to ex-
plain such fuzziness and infinity. It was the 
modest job of scientists to point to a new  
scientific horizon for all these “speculative” 
matters.  
This_began in the days of Bohr and 
Schrödinger and Gödel and Einstein, of 
Wheeler and Dyson and Penrose. We see it 
clearly in the works – disparate as they are – 
of Gerald Edelman and Gregory J. Chaitin 
and David Deutsch, and above all (since his 
contribution is so fundamental that its strict 
limitation to technical aspects is enough to 
shed light on a whole new landscape) Noam 
Chomsky. And Russell may have been right 
in claiming that the philosophical and com-
monsensical mind/matter dichotomy is itself, 
obsolete even to define the opposite field of 
physics, and materialism: reality is consti-
tuted by quantum information, some say. Or 
all  physicalistically   defined   reality  is  itself, 
somehow, in a formal way, mental, as we 
hinted above (and see below). Or, philo-
sophically, a new foundationalism resting on 
“Cartesian truths”, in a sense, may well not 
contradict, but foster and found a new scien-
tific ontology of abstract and concrete reali-
ties. This is the whole point of Orilia’s con-
tribution, connecting new “old foundatio-
nalism”, a theory of propositions, and a form 
of descriptivist semantics esp. about first-
person sing. indexicality. 
Here’s a brand new piece of philosophical 
news. Functionalism is (a kind of) dualism, 
though not dualism in the sense of the physi-
calists or Popper and Eccles’s. The functio-  
nalist emperor’s new clothes, and intuitions, 
have been out in the open and the rain a long 
time, and he’s naked, and soaked. It is often 
assumed, however, that the major working 
breakthrough in scientific psychology and 
the cognitive sciences – the life-work of 
Chomsky, Kayne, Marr and a few others, 
with their followers – can be still made com-
patible with a kind of socially acceptable 
physicalism by adopting a functionalist 
background (what is not voiced is the trivial 
truth I exposed above, and the general diffi-
culties I hinted at). 
One has to admit that most depends, in 
these matters, on the fine technical details 
and even historical implications of the theo-
ries you build. For the dilemmas are old, and, 
even if formally developed, painfully clear to 
intelligence but hard to solve even to com-
mon sense. Russell (after 1919, with his de-
finitive embracing of calculus ratiocinator, as 
Hintikka would put it), and Chomsky and 
others are basically right in surmising, in 
widely different forms, that after Newton 
(and Locke, and Reid, etc.) it became close  
to impossible (and still is) to  understand 
what a form of “naturalism” clearly separated 
from “mentalism”  (an even vaguer concept)  
might be.  
As a consequence, the basis of nowadays 
physicalism may well be flawed from the start 
and in re. Sure, if one is still a physicalist 
and/or a naturalist, as Russell then, and Ga-
len Strawson and others now, try to be, there 
seems to be little alternative to neutral     
monism – including or not something close 
to “anomalous monism” too (Chomsky’s 
naturalism, or Searle’s at that, seems however 
to be of different nature. And obviously, neo-
mysterianism looms close to them).  
There  are   consequences,   well-discussed  
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by Hinzen and Uriagerieka, or Piattelli-
Palmarini, I will not delve into, though I fol-
low them. First, a radical (mentalistic?)        
reform of all that is physical and experiential, 
and, second, possibly panpsychism itself. 
Similar consequences are both in Strawson 
and in Chalmers,9 though I do not claim that 
their views are similar. I advanced a criticism 
of Strawson’s take on the phenomenal at the 
beginning, and shall not insist. But as for lan-
guage and mind – and this precious but du-
bious center of the naively considered mind, 
the self – other consequences seem both un-
deniable and of greater momentum. As I 
promised, they are more provocatively, and 
more convincingly, put forward as a histori-
cal point. Chomskyan scholarship and phi-
lology (let alone Strawsonian ones) are beside 
the point here. Let us ask bluntly: who ac-
tually said that Descartes was a dualist? 
(Though the Cartesius of the “metaphysical” 
tradition was.) And who said that he was not 
a physicalist? (Though the term is senseless 
in that tradition, and ambiguous today).  
Well, Strawson certainly didn’t, and nei-
ther in a sense did  Chomsky,  nor  did  either 
admit to being materialist dualists. And more 
interestingly, this was never claimed, not 
even in another terminology, so far as I un-
derstand, by Descartes’ two earliest and best 
interpreters: no less than Arnauld and, above 
all, Pascal. 
On the whole, most old scholarship 
proves – though it dare not express it verba-
tim – that Descartes was not a real dualist, 
was not a real (rationalist) metaphysician (he 
always preferred prima philosophia to meta-
physica and theologia, which were derogatory 
terms in his book), and was not an enemy of 
a systematically general scientific view of the 
world. Whatever they (believed they) con-
cluded with their findings, this is what all 
those researchers proved and found, from 
our point of view (such present-day key 
scholars are Jean-Luc Marion and Michel 
Henry). Showing this would require us to  
engage in extensive readings of scholarly 
texts that are often masterpieces of philoso-
phy in their own right (mainly French, partly 
German, interpretations from the last two 
centuries), and that unfortunately almost no 
one reads any more, overwhelmed as we are 
by most of the Anglo-American vulgate and 
its theoretical simplifications (as people were, 
decades ago, by simplistic historical labels). 
But such interpretations, and recent ones 
too,10 at their best show that Descartes was, 
in more than one sense, a precursor of Kant, 
rather than the rationalist metaphysician that 
Kant just exposed and debunked.  
This is not to deny Kant’s Revolution, nor 
that there is often more than a bit of national 
revanchism in old French, so-called secon-
dary Descartes-Literatur (or in German     
writings on Leibniz or Kepler). But there 
were intuitions in Descartes, both natura-
listic and transcendentalistic ones, that      
neither Kant nor his contemporaries (or 
ours) could fully appreciate._ 
Again, Strawson is right, though he dis-
covered nothing new. Just because he ex-
posed an unasserted (since Pascal) but evi-
dent truth: namely that Descartes, the anti-
metaphysical Father of Modern Science (no 
doubt, in a soon superseded form), was a sort 
of physicalist, if we want to use jargon in the 
face of the subtleties of the lingua franca of 
philosophers (W. Sellars), the history of    
ideas. He was not a spiritualist, nor did he 
ever think about creating a science of the 
mind alternative to “mechanical science”. 
Mechanistic explanations, and vortexes and 
plenism, soon needed integration in a more 
complex view of reality, the Newtonian one – 
and here Chomsky’s specifications and criti-
cisms fall into place. But this has little to do 
with transforming Descartes into a Dualist 
Metaphysician par excellence, and so, by ex-
tension, all his considerate contemporary fol-
lowers into enemies of science and “mate-
rialism”: materialism is the Treppenwitz des 
zwanzigsten Jahrhunderts.  
In the quantum revolution(s), we pene-
trated the secrets of matter and energy in a 
purely “materialistic” way, and thus did old, 
solid matter become utterly lost and un-
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recognizable in the process, like “force”, “ac-
tion”, and “cause”, as well as “mechanic com-
ponents”, had in Newton’s wake._ 
Substantia_sive forma is, in Descartes’ in-
herited and soon transformed Latin, not re-
ally a notion that can be applied to the world 
we are epistemically given in any straight-
forward way, but only per equivocationem 
(Descartes rejected metaphysics and theo-
logy, i.e., grosso modo, any talking about infi-
nite substances as objects of real cognition; 
you can see this also as meaning that – ante 
litteram – substantia is to be applied, so to 
speak, exclusively in a “transcendental” way, 
not in any realist or empiricist fashion).  
Ergo, as he writes – late in the path of the 
Meditationes – about substantia extensa ac 
substantia cogitans, it is simply misleading to 
assume that they are on a par to him, even 
less that they constitute two worlds. He was a 
man between two worlds, but not in this 
sense, nor had he envisaged being a citizen of 
two worlds.  
The Meditationes are a kind of epistemo-
logical exercice spirituel, in a transfigured    
Jesuit understanding of this. Contextualistic 
aspects, more relevant than skeptic ones, 
ought to be taken into serious account too. 
Skeptic research must take place, but only 
semel in vita. It stays relegated here, in medi-
tation, with respect to everyday practices of 
science, and even rationally guided living. 
What we mean, with Descartes, is just that 
the mind is a res, in the technical sense, but 
not a reality in today’s sense. It is as evident 
and undeniable an experience (it is expe-
rience), as the extension of reality is (and all 
we can experience, and measure, and co-
gnize). But by no means do we imply that the 
former is an object of science, or of any in-
quiry going beyond the study of adequate 
language. Only the latter is an object of ex-
perimental science: a provable, analyzable, 
mathematizable part of reality. 
It may seem to us a strange process, 
founded on subtle, ad hoc distinctions. And it 
is. But there is one more thing we gain there-
by, as Pascal in his De l’esprit Géométrique 
was swift to recognize: the distinction         
between the two res has simply the purpose 
of showing that the cogito poses a definitive 
distinction between mind (and mathematics) 
and the real world,  so  that  understanding  
the  world is a purely mechanical enterprise. 
My ironical quote of Browning’s ironic 
misgivings about Philistine, and unscientific, 
dualism stands even if we take “soul” in its 
full, yet strictly limited, Cartesian sense. We 
should not look for animacy or autonomy or 
agency where scientific descriptions aptly 
predominate. In the same spirit, we should 
not look for the self but in the realm of 
mathematical, formal and logical explanation 
of the transcendental, conceptual conditions 
of our explanation of behaviour – including 
our explanations of our processes of pro-
ducing science and physicalist interpretations 
of the (only one given) world. In this limited 
sense the self is rightly downplayed. We  
hinted at that at the beginning. But for one       
aspect: that the self is not primary. In ob-
servable behavior and biologically considered 
processes it is not. There is no self or cona-
rion in the brain. There is no Self in the 
world: Kant’s or even Descartes’.  
I take this to sound almost as obvious. 
Yet, can we be sure that in some advanced 
dimension of language and of the ordering of 
reality – a dimension that is as far from the 
experience of givens as it is close to the self-
understanding apprehension of order and 
structure through mathematical elaboration 
– a function such as (that of) the self is not 
primary?  
I do not mean such a function as imme-
diately produces an a priori certainty of      
existence, what is usually attributed to an 
“ethereal” Cartesian cogito – a piece of Carte-
sian understanding in itself to be revised, 
since Kant and others proved it wrong (there 
is no compelling evidence Descartes had ac-
tually endorsed it). I mean an abstract     
function of ordering of experiences and   
cognitions into unity, as in the Kantian ich 
denke, possibly in a further weakened form.  
There is_after  all, in a sense,  a primacy of 
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the self, though it is not in itself transparent. 
It resembles, I suggest, the primacy of lan-
guage, that also has little to do with the world 
as it is vs the world as we think it, while try-
ing to go beyond those preliminary represen-
tations of ours to find an ultimate rationale. 
Pure neuroscientists  and  their  followers, 
brain naturalists and materialists, conclude 
that there is no self, nor any distinctive (even 
only potential) structure for all mental states. 
And rightly so. If, I mean, the mind is the 
brain, or barely supervenes on it, there is no 
CPU in it, nor a distinctive, even less a meta-
physical, science-transcending center. Mo-
reover, it is argued, the self cannot be an    
object of science, and the conceivability of 
zombie-worlds is but a trick of human       
semantical  imagination, of the representa-
tional mind itself.  
The mind or brain, in its attempt to com-
prehend itself, overgenerates empty repre-
sentations, the whole passing theatre and a 
régisseur in it (Dennettian scenarios are far 
from making all this clear instead of para-
doxical from a philosophical standpoint. At-
tempts at solutions are sometimes elegant, 
and will hopefully be discussed in the next 
section I’ll help edit).  
That the very general findings of trans-
formational linguistics and the cognitive   
sciences make this vision, and its as-
sumptions, dubious or worse is a suspicion I 
hinted at already. But, as far as I know, there 
are no fully convincing and shared arguments 
(yet). Nor should opponents from these sides 
have any real quarrel with the scientific    
monition that the mind’s attempt to        
comprehend itself is doomed. Many of them 
say so too, though for other ideological rea-
sons – they do not imply it is only right this 
way, usually. Already existing problems lie 
elsewhere. And not just for neurophiloso-
phers.  
Firstly,_the suggestion that the self, and 
(so-called metaphysical) self-consciousness, is 
a non-naturalizable, hence a non-natural, un-
real, and semantically uncanny “reality” is it-
self bizarre. If you put two apples beside two 
more apples you get four apples. If you put 
them beside two pears you get four fruits  an-
yway. If you put a male dinosaur beside a fe-
male dinosaur, well, chances are you get three 
or more dinosaurs. This is no refutation of 
elementary number theory, it just means that 
one needs to apply it in a more sophisticated 
computation in order to understand reality 
(even more complicated if, as in the Jurassic 
Park movie, dinosaurs can change sex and so 
two males will do.)  
This is elementary, but as the Big Bang 
“came out” of a singularity (or quantum   
fluctuations, or imaginary time, or something 
else, or did not come out at all) the maths 
implemented was exquisitely complex. As in 
the case of dinosaurs, notice, there was no 
one to watch, and it was possible there would 
never be. Shall we deny this? Shall we say that 
maths, and logics, is/are an illusion of ours, 
of our human conceptual schemes and repre-
sentations? Shall we say that we just (re-) 
construct an a posteriori or post festum ma-
thematization or logicization of purely natu-
ral, physical events and things? That is, 
2+2=4 is not always, tenselessly true, at least 
for things with identity and numerosity?  
See it the way you like, naturalism – and 
emergentism – surprisingly smell of idealism, 
again, immer wieder. And they are not the 
only ones. To answer that some level of self is 
but a formal function of experience, or a    
necessary feature thereof, just sounds more 
consistent, though admittedly not unproble-
matic. 
Secondly, it is generally recognized that 
there is a precursor subject of a fully natu-
ralistic self. It is the (ancestral) immune     
system. It may go wrong exactly like the   
human self in schizophrenia, though the use 
of first-person sing. indexicals is not directly 
impaired. It distinguishes (genetic) friend 
from foe for defense purposes. Both aspects 
connect to Marraffa’s considerations on the 
self. On the other hand, as genetics comes  
into question, we are again pushed toward 
the spheres of language and/or mathematical 
computation, if we want to make sense of 
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some concepts, once metaphysical (Edel-
man’s “neural Darwinism” and the search for 
neural correlates ultimately derive from 
Edelman’s groundbreaking work on immuni-
ty and adaptive systems)._ 
Mathematization is not consciousness or 
experience – but maybe just in the very end – 
so no swift conclusion is at hand, nor is any 
need to go (weakly) Anthropic. Yet one won-
ders whether “naturalizing” maths and logics 
makes any sense at all. Many will doubt it, at 
least if naturalization is taken in the above 
strict sense. One wonders then whether one 
can distinguish, at this level of analysis, (in-
nate) linguistic faculties and (partly humanly 
constructed) mathematical faculties, or    
generally formal ones. If we rule we cannot, 
we have consequences for self-consciousness 
both surprising and not so clearly anti-
naturalistic, rather formally distinctive, defla-
tionary ones. G. Bealer and others suggested 
that functionalism fails when confronted 
with-self-consciousness, or shows severe   
limits – as both mental and logico-mathe-
matical structures are not of “materialistic” 
nature, whatever people mean by this. 
Materialism, functionalism, representa-
tional-computational theories of mind etc. 
agree that there is a subject to be explained 
away by making it “material”. This is rough, 
but right, if the subject is, were, what makes 
(real or thought) things conscious. But again, 
on formal grounds, it is not. A state one is 
conscious of being in poses, endlessly, the 
question about that “one”. So a conscious 
state is what constitutes a subject as such, 
and is not made such by an unexplained sub-
ject. A conscious state, consciousness, is “ex-
perience”. This is the line Nagel, with Jack-
son, took in 1974, without developing it (a 
caution to be approved).11  
The problem is how “(real or thought) 
things” double as experience. Since before 
Kant, there is no term so dangerously ide-
alistic as “experience”. Russell saw it clearly 
in 1918, before abandoning his project of a 
“Cartesian” epistemology. But a material 
subject meets no experiences.  
Possibly  Cartesianism   and  such  are  not 
the solution. At least two papers in this col-
lection, Marchi & Romano’s and Delfitto & 
Fiorin’s (as indexicality is so close to expe-
rience in a minimal sense), wrestle with this 
problem, still so widespread and multifarious 
in the literature. Voltolini’s focusses on the 
real, linguistic,  hallmark of the mental 
among other, more common or “material” 
functions. We are not drawing morals from 
these discussions. But this is the problem to 
tackle if Ned Block is right and the HOT ap-
proach is “defunct”.12 Marchi & Romano 
start from Jackendoff’s approach (see also 
the discussion of Jesse Prinz’ synthesis).13 
Delfitto & Fiorin even resort to the philo-
sophical and psychological notion of mini-
selves. 
The_phenomenal, “what it is like” dimen-
sion opens a whole register of discourse not 
opposite, but orthogonal to the physi-calist 
one. Qualia are not another substance, even 
less the subject matter of alternative physics. 
This has little to do with the necessity, em-
phasized by Quentin Smith, of taking into 
account the developments of quantum phys-
ics. We may well take into account that, 
probably, quantum cognitive science will ar-
rive; but cannot apply it in advance at every 
step. So no one is ready today to argue that a 
self, even if shown to be a sort of abstraction, 
even as purely phenomenal, is a necessary, 
unitary, certain assumption. Furthermore, 
there are plural levels, the orthogonalilty of 
discourse about consciousness being only 
one.  
The self is encoded in language; but in 
which ways, and whether as an evolutionary 
basis or result, is not clear. I certainly do not 
claim that what has been suggested here 
(and/or in the following contributions, which 
are to be kept well distinct) solve the real, 
well-known problems. But some new roads 
are interesting to evaluate and for future  
theories to look at. We are not crazy. We be-
lieve in science, the one made now, not fu-
ture science (though even physicists try to 
guess at it).  
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This includes believing that language and 
its logic, and mind, are to a large extent part 
not of culture, but nature – a nature thus in-
evitably deemed, to varied degrees, to be un-
fathomable by many, or to be very, very      
distant from deep-rooted, revered assump-
tions and models of analysis. But the correc-
tions about Descartes (who was similarly 
minded) seem to me convincing. They make 
sense, needless to say, if we place them on the 
background of a Cartesian conception of 
language and argument etc. still not easy to 
regain and revise in full today.14 
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